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The COVID-19 pandemic has caused severe impacts to global economies on a scale not 38 
seen in more than a generation. Stay at home policies, widespread travel cancellations, and 39 
restrictions on most communal activities have all dealt a blow to daily economic interactions. 40 
Many affluent countries hit hard by the virus, including the US and countries within Europe, 41 
have been planning and implementing massive investments of government stimulus in 42 
attempts to stave off dramatically rising unemployment and risk of fiscal collapse. Many are 43 
casting these efforts as an attempt to ‘return to normal’ or ‘get the economy back on track’. But 44 
recent assessments of the state of planetary health from the Intergovernmental Science-Policy 45 
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services1 and other global bodies tell us that a return to 46 
normal, pre-pandemic business as usual is not acceptable, and will undermine future prosperity 47 
of humans and the planet.  48 
Rapid degradation of ecosystems and biodiversity over the past 50 years has put 49 
enormous stress on the natural systems that supply humanity with food, water and other 50 
benefits from nature, and put up to 1 million species at risk of extinction.2 The IPBES Global 51 
Assessment (GA) report, released in May 2019, linked these changes to direct drivers such as 52 
land/sea-use change (particularly agricultural expansion), direct exploitation of wild species, 53 
climate change, invasive alien species and pollution, all of which, in turn, are shaped by indirect 54 
drivers, such as demographic and social changes and economic interests.1 Indeed, the global 55 
economy has expanded rapidly over the last half century, and the accelerating scale of capital 56 
accumulation and trade flows in the contemporary era have led to telecoupled and spillover 57 
effects, including large-scale habitat destruction that has been linked to the emergence of novel 58 
viral diseases, such as COVID-19.3 Such ecological degradation has long been known to pose 59 
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substantial threats to economic production because of its potential to undermine the natural 60 
resources on which much economic activity is based, as well as problems for human health and 61 
work productivity, but until the emergence of COVID-19, such risks seemed distant.4  62 
Now we are at a crossroads. We must not only address the short-term economic pain in 63 
countries under stay at home orders and social distancing recommendations, but also think 64 
about what kind of economy we want and need for a sustainable, just, and equitable future in 65 
the long-term. Quick ‘fixes’ to get economies back on track are likely to fail to address the deep 66 
pre-existing sustainability and inequality challenges we face, therefore care and consideration 67 
of nature and justice need to be part of any solution. Evidence suggests that many citizens of 68 
the US and EU countries agree that a post-COVID-19 recovery must reflect attention to values 69 
like improving the environment, tackling climate change, and ensuring social equity.5  70 
While many scientists and politicians have been making the arguments for a COVID-19 71 
recovery that is low-carbon6, there has been much less attention to how to include biodiversity 72 
and ecosystems in such a transition for socio-ecological resilience. The few mentions of 73 
biodiversity or ecosystem-based actions related to the current pandemic have primarily focused 74 
on closing wildlife markets as a potential source of novel viruses, or expanding protected 75 
natural areas, rather than attention to the wider issues and drivers that create economic 76 
demands and ecological disruptions in the first place.7,8 Further, initial indications are that 77 
biodiversity is not being prioritized in recovery packages; indeed, the EU in late May released a 78 
draft ‘green recovery’ plan to spend more than €1 trillion on economic stimulus measures the 79 
same week as a new biodiversity strategic plan funded at only €20 billion, with little overlap 80 
between the two approaches.9 Our concern is that biodiversity is too often seen as an 81 
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afterthought: as less important than climate action, or as a detriment to economic expansion or 82 
re-employment. In reality, there are a number of steps and policies that would aid economic 83 
recovery while at the same time addressing many of the root causes of biodiversity loss, 84 
including connections with zoonotic diseases. We revisit some of the analysis from the IPBES 85 
global assessment to help provide guidance on restructuring the global economic system to 86 
reduce pressures on natural systems and encourage a resilient recovery, which in turn might 87 
make pandemics driven by the human-wildlife interface less likely in the future. 88 
Immediate needs 89 
Given the need for rapid and massive inputs of capital to combat economic distress, 90 
government stimulus measures and relief packages can make choices that have positive 91 
impacts on biodiversity and ecosystems and lay the foundations for longer-term resilience. 92 
There is clear evidence for existing economic drivers of biodiversity loss (Figure 1), and to 93 
reverse these trends national governments could now prioritize a series of steps.   94 
1). Shift from environmentally harmful subsidies to beneficial ones. In an era of rising fiscal red 95 
ink, environmentally harmful subsidies make neither economic nor ecological sense. In 2015, 96 
agricultural support potentially harmful to nature amounted to US$100 billion in OECD 97 
countries alone, while fossil fuel subsidies, which generate both end carbon emissions and 98 
water and land pollution at sites of extraction, range between US$300-680 billion per year and 99 
result in estimated global damages of US$5 trillion in reduced natural functioning, offsetting 100 
any economic advantage they confer.10 Many governments subsidize fishing by national fleets, 101 
estimated to be over US$35 billion per year, often encouraging overfishing and exceeding the 102 
net economic benefit obtained.11 Overall, the amount of finance mobilized to promote 103 
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biodiversity is conservatively estimated to be outweighed by environmentally harmful subsidies 104 
by a factor of ten.10  105 
Subsidies are not in and of themselves inherently bad; they are a useful tool for 106 
governments to make investments in areas that can promote ecosystem resilience. But now is 107 
the time to eliminate those subsidies that drive biodiversity loss and carbon emissions, 108 
although unfortunately, the current turmoil in global oil markets is driving some countries to 109 
the opposite conclusion. Many of the existing subsidy policies were put in place for other 110 
reasons, such as to maintain the economic viability of rural areas, or support new industries, 111 
but such objectives can be achieved with positive approaches that promote public goods, 112 
rather than the over-exploitation of natural resources with significant long-term costs. 113 
However, subsidy reform often is challenged by vested interests.12 Studies of reform successes 114 
undertaken by a handful of countries suggest the need to act quickly when presented with 115 
windows of opportunity that may be outside the influence of domestic policy makers and 116 
unrelated to the environment (for example, current human health crises); build alliances 117 
between economic and environmental interests in common; devise targeted measures to 118 
address potential impacts on competitiveness and income distribution; build a robust evidence 119 
base on the social costs and benefits of reform; and encourage broad stakeholder 120 
engagement.13 121 
Existing positive subsidies with outcomes on biodiversity that could be expanded in 122 
COVID-19 recovery plans include support to farmers who conserve and better provision 123 
ecosystem health on their lands, used within both the US Conservation Reserve Program and 124 
the EU Common Agricultural Policy. However, in both cases, positive subsidies to encourage 125 
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environmentally friendly farming practices (for example, conservation set-asides, organic 126 
agriculture, low-intensity systems, integrated farm management, and preservation of landscape 127 
of high-value habitats) are usually outweighed by other government subsidies that encourage 128 
overproduction and agricultural expansion.14  129 
The pandemic has further revealed that shorter supply chains are more resilient and 130 
contribute to local food sovereignty, which may reverse previous trends towards vertical 131 
consolidation and extended global trade in agricultural products.15 One additional form of 132 
public subsidy that can be used to support this transition to local foodsheds is through public 133 
procurement. Just as government purchases of medical supplies has spurred needed 134 
production for the COVID-19 response, the power of public purchasing of food grown using 135 
biodiversity-protecting agro-ecological methods can increase local production and encourage 136 
an upscaling of environmentally sound investments.16  137 
2). Expand new taxation policies for environmental harms. Environmental policy has a long 138 
history of using environmental taxes to reduce pollution and increase resource use efficiency, 139 
such as gas taxes or plastic bag fees; however, very few direct consumption or other taxes have 140 
been designed specifically to preserve biodiversity. Many taxes on activities or products 141 
exerting negative (and often indirect) effects on ecosystems and biodiversity rely either on the 142 
polluter-pay principle or on the user-pay principle, which can serve to nudge people towards 143 
certain behaviors (such as bottle recycling fees), but most existing taxes are too low to 144 
significantly reduce negative impacts.17 Currently, given the need to rapidly raise sources of 145 
revenue for local, state and national governments, ecosystem-related taxes could be increased 146 
and expanded, including resource extraction taxes (e.g. timber); pesticide taxes; diffuse 147 
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pollution taxes, including water pollution charges and taxes; air pollution and gasoline taxes, 148 
given that air pollutants harm ecosystems through acidification and eutrophication of inland 149 
waters; carbon taxes; and waste and packaging taxes.18 The experience of a recent carbon tax 150 
in France, which was met by protests from the Yellow Vests movement, may seem a 151 
discouraging example, but in fact well-designed taxes that include a way to address equity 152 
concerns so that they do not unfairly fall on certain populations are likely to receive more 153 
public support.19 For example, proposals for a carbon fee/tax that is paired with a dividend can 154 
help solve these problems, since a majority of mostly low and middle income households would 155 
receive more in dividends than they would spend in higher taxes.20 However, rather than 156 
seeking to increase taxes on some industries causing environmental damage, some post-COVID 157 
recovery packages are actually moving in the opposite direction by reducing taxes and relaxing 158 
regulations, a short-term strategy for economic stimulus that is likely to have longer-term 159 
negative health and environmental consequences (Figure 2).21  160 
Governments can also seek to reform tax havens and retain more revenue at home in 161 
an era of tightening belts. Offshore and hidden accounts reduce the amount of financing 162 
available to governments for global public goods provisioning, and provide bad actors with 163 
opportunities to avoid financial scrutiny, reducing the impact of policies such as certification or 164 
supply chain monitoring. A recent study of tax havens found that 70% of known fishing vessels 165 
implicated in illegal fishing are flagged in a tax haven, and that nearly 70% of foreign capital to 166 
the largest companies raising soy and beef in the Amazon, prime drivers of deforestation, were 167 
channeled through tax havens.22 Preventing companies who use tax havens from reaping any 168 
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benefits of post-COVID recovery money from public coffers is one possible action that could be 169 
taken.  170 
3). Institute criteria to guide greener investments that support biodiversity. In the short term, 171 
as the private sector seeks grants and loans to shore up payrolls and ensure the possibility of 172 
longer-term viability, governments should seek to prioritize support for those businesses that 173 
do not harm biodiversity, and put restrictions on those that accept investment. For example, 174 
after the 2008-9 automotive company bailout in the US, the Obama administration had 175 
leverage to work with car manufacturers to increase fuel economy standards, and the 2009 176 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act provided numerous loans and tax credits towards 177 
greener vehicle development.23 Similar plans could be required for businesses receiving bailout 178 
funds, including having biodiversity risk mitigation plans, requiring disclosures of impact, and 179 
building ecosystem considerations into decision-making; so far, only Canada has proposed that 180 
bailout funds to large corporations will require adherence to carbon disclosure standards. 181 
Evidence suggests that currently few strings are being attached to stimulus and bailout money 182 
for private corporations, such as airlines, which outside of France have not been required to 183 
tackle reduced carbon emissions as part of their receipt of public funds. Other relevant 184 
examples could include requirements for any financial support to the cruise industry to 185 
minimize their considerable contribution to ocean pollution.24 Such measures and standards 186 
need to be combined with transparency as to where bailout funds and stimulus investments are 187 
being directed, so as to harness public scrutiny of these efforts.25 188 
For the financial sector, including banks, wealth and pension funds, private equity, 189 
insurance companies, and others, a mix of regulations and incentives would encourage 190 
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investments in sectors and technologies that reduce pressures on nature.26 Privately funded 191 
large-scale land acquisitions in many tropical countries, particularly for export commodities, 192 
have been implicated in higher rates of deforestation, even outside the investment lands.27 The 193 
FIRE sector (finance, insurance and real estate) is increasingly implicated in biodiversity loss; for 194 
example, increased farmland prices resulting from investments in specialized real estate trusts 195 
may drive agricultural expansion that leads to ecosystem alteration.28 Trends towards 196 
securitization (bundling of nontraded assets or debt and risk transformed into a tradable asset) 197 
represented in commodity index funds, futures markets, and derivatives markets have grown 198 
dramatically, are increasingly complex, and are increasingly disconnected to actual material 199 
flows of goods.29, 30 For example, futures contracts are a key factor in the production and trade 200 
of agricultural commodities such as soy, coffee, tea and palm oil. While they offer potential 201 
income stability to manage risks for producers, they are also an opportunity for speculation and 202 
hedging on price movements that have environmental implications: there is evidence that 203 
speculation in agricultural derivatives markets contributed to higher and more volatile food 204 
prices in 2007 and 2008, which in turn drove investment in the expansion of production.31  205 
However, the financial sector is also an important potential pressure point to curb the 206 
negative impacts of public and private actors on the environment.32 The Network for Greening 207 
the Financial System has noted that central banks can play a key role to ensure environmental 208 
standards are set and met (as well as move quickly), and the EU’s new sustainable finance 209 
guidelines are one example; these standards provide for liability of banks for the socio-210 
environmental impact of their investments, and could be accelerated in the post-COVID 211 
recovery.33 Indeed, research shows that banks that adopt environmental standards show less 212 
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exposure to risk.34 Emphasizing the risks of ‘stranded assets’ (such as oil reserves) has been an 213 
effective strategy to guide disinvestment in the fossil fuel sector35; this model could be 214 
translated to biodiversity concerns by emphasizing the risks that come with agribusiness 215 
investments that might have liabilities around pesticide pollution or loss of crucial pollinators, 216 
as one case study has shown.36 While securities, derivatives, and other speculative financial 217 
instruments bring with them considerable ecological and economic risks, more sustainable and 218 
secure options exist in capital markets, such as ‘green’ bonds, which raise funds for both private 219 
and public investment in sustainable projects, and these may seem more attractive in a 220 
recovery economy. Green bonds have raised hundreds of billions for renewable energy and 221 
infrastructure for low-carbon futures37; however, similar initiatives for biodiversity are not yet 222 
in place, as less than 3% of the existing bond market goes to agriculture and forestry 223 
investments.38  224 
Improved financial standards also need to be tied to public disclosure of information on 225 
investments. Studies of corporate social responsibility standards, certification, disclosure, and 226 
other voluntary actions by companies and investment sources suggest that these tools can be 227 
effective given the right circumstances.39 For example, shareholder activism and socially-228 
conscious investment around climate often uses information from the Carbon Disclosure 229 
Project to evaluate risks and impacts of participating corporate entities40; similar reporting and 230 
disclosure around biodiversity impacts would help direct investment. However, these voluntary 231 
instruments are usually limited due to a lack of systematic monitoring and reporting of impacts 232 
of sourcing practices; lack of follow-up within commodity chains, leading to concerns about 233 
‘greenwashing’; and insufficient economic benefits for companies to adopt sustainable 234 
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practices in the first place.41 Investment standards and statutes could expand fiduciary 235 
responsibilities to address some of these problems42; for example, use of third-party beneficiary 236 
standing would allow outside parties to take legal action if principles adopted by companies are 237 
not followed.  238 
4). Funding work programs and universal basic income with an ecosystem focus. In the 239 
immediate aftermath of the economic crisis, government-supported work programs can be 240 
essential in reducing widespread unemployment. Just as the Works Progress Administration 241 
and Civilian Conservation Corps were used in the US during the Great Depression, jobs in 242 
ecological restoration and green infrastructure could be a source of both employment and 243 
ecological benefits.43 Given current demands for increased racial justice, and the 244 
disproportionate impact COVID-19 has had on communities of color, such employment 245 
programs can be targeted to these harder-hit areas, such as in urban ecosystem restoration and 246 
green infrastructure.44 A recent survey of economists found that stimulus measures focused on 247 
green infrastructure (both biodiversity and climate) were rated among the most positive 248 
potential measures, delivering both short and long term economic and societal benefits, while 249 
airline bailouts were rated as the worst stimulus option.6 Experience shows that these 250 
investments work; marine restoration projects funded as part of the American Recovery and 251 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in 2009 generated more jobs per million USD invested than many 252 
other sectors, such as fossil fuels.45 Many payments for environmental services (PES) programs 253 
globally have been used to support employment in activities such as invasive species removal, 254 
reforestation and restoration, and other investments in both people and nature46, and these 255 
could be rapidly upscaled, as they usually have more demand than finances allow.  256 
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The COVID-19 pandemic has also opened space for consideration of "emergency basic 257 
income" proposals, such as paying US$2000 per person monthly until the pandemic subsides, as 258 
a quick, efficient, non-bureaucratic method to put cash into people's hands for basic needs.47 259 
Given the precariousness of many households revealed during this crisis, longer term universal 260 
basic income (UBI) support and other policies could emerge as well in the wake. UBI could have 261 
biodiversity impacts in that a subsistence-level UBI has been suggested as a way to facilitate 262 
simpler lifestyles with smaller ecological footprints, and to valorize unpaid work such as child 263 
raising or volunteer activity that typically has a lower carbon footprint than paid labor.48 UBI 264 
subsidies could also be raised via sources like carbon or pollution taxes, as noted above, in 265 
which the revenue is then distributed as a per capita dividend. Similar programs that have tied 266 
payments to environmental behaviors, such as some conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs 267 
and payments for environmental services, show that such programs can work if incentives are 268 
structured appropriately and local monitoring and legitimacy is strong.49 In fact, recent analysis 269 
of a CCT program in Indonesia shows that it reduced deforestation, although it was not 270 
designed for conservation ends.50  271 
A roadmap for longer-term economic strategies and priorities 272 
In the longer-term, both governments and market actors must aim to achieve a more 273 
sustainable economy that better integrates the protection of nature. The relentless expansion 274 
of the current global economy underpins the drivers of biodiversity loss, as well as contributing 275 
to continuing inequality, and a transformative change of the economy is urgently needed.51, 52 276 
The GA assessed a series of possibilities, based on evidence of effectiveness of existing policies 277 
and scenarios of what future worlds might look like, declaring a need for “incorporating the 278 
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reduction of inequalities into development pathways, reducing overconsumption and waste 279 
and addressing environmental impacts, such as externalities of economic activities, from the 280 
local to the global scales.”1 Below we focus on some key steps that can be taken over the 281 
longer-term to ensure transformative economic change (Figure 3).  282 
1). Rethink production models. Shorter and more localized supply chains are likely to be 283 
inevitable in a post-COVID-19 world, as the current just-in-time models have revealed 284 
themselves to be vulnerable to interruption.53 Many supply chains already faced systemic risks 285 
inherent in the dependency of business on ecosystem services that are overused or poorly 286 
managed.54 For example, over the past several decades, commodity chain verticalization in 287 
agribusiness has created the conditions for overproduction with negative impacts for 288 
biodiversity, driven in part by private equity investments that pressure many producers to cut 289 
costs, the collapse of international commodity agreements that have resulted in increased 290 
production even when not met by demand, and current trade rules that encourage 291 
unsustainable sourcing.28 Shifting from global supply chains to more localized production needs 292 
to balance efficiency with resilience, and will require new production sites and models, such as 293 
new breeds or crop practices for shorter food supply chains. All these will need to be planned 294 
sustainably and with the participation of multiple stakeholders, including consumers. Such 295 
restructuring of supply chains can partially address the existing ecologically unequal exchange 296 
embodied in land intensive commodities, which have depleted natural stocks of originating 297 
countries.55  298 
At the same time, global trade will continue to be needed, particularly as not all areas 299 
can supply sufficient food in localized supply chains.56 Thus these efforts can be supported by 300 
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reformed trade agreements, which need to shift from their dominant focus on trade 301 
liberalization towards securing fairness, equity and sustainability, including rules that provide 302 
greater policy space for governments to prioritize and support local production standards.57 303 
Work within WTO has aimed at eliminating economically distorting subsidies, but could be 304 
expanded by creating a true “green box” for biodiversity-friendly initiatives to encourage 305 
elimination of ecologically harmful subsidies and overproduction stimulated by trade 306 
distortions. Other work within trade regimes has included the EU’s consideration of carbon 307 
border taxes to discourage leakage, and similar steps could be taken for green production 308 
supply chains that avoid land-based emissions and preserve biodiversity in particular.58 309 
Reforming global trade and production will also require multinational corporations to move 310 
away from the paradigm that their primary financial aim is to maximize dividends for 311 
shareholders, which often encourages unsustainable overproduction.59 312 
 313 
2) Rethink ways to reduce excess consumption. Consumption is a major driver of unsustainable 314 
production, and the GA encouraged countries to focus on “improving standards, systems and 315 
relevant regulations aimed at internalizing the external costs of production, extraction and 316 
consumption (such as pricing wasteful or polluting practices, including through penalties); 317 
promoting resource efficiency and circular and other economic models; voluntary 318 
environmental and social certification of market chains; and incentives that promote 319 
sustainable practices and innovation.”1 The COVID-19 pandemic may accelerate trends towards 320 
reduced consumption, given massively reduced travel and rethinking what counts as a good 321 
quality of life.60 However, many immediate stimulus measures that have been proposed focus 322 
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on increased consumption, such as reductions in VAT taxes, without much attention to the 323 
ecological impacts of such actions.  324 
Steps to reduce excess consumption can include both incentives and regulations: 325 
targeting consumer behavior with tools such as education initiatives, choice architecture, and 326 
collaborative consumption (such as sharing and reuse), as well as resource use caps and 327 
changes in incentives and subsidies.61, 62 The idea of circular economies and decoupling 328 
resource use and economic growth is slowly catching on in some European countries, but is not 329 
yet widespread elsewhere.63 Some have posited that transitions within economic sectors, such 330 
as from resource-intensive production of natural resources to more service or financially-331 
oriented economies (which may be accelerated by COVID-19 work-from-home trends), would 332 
lead to smaller environmental impacts. Evidence suggests, however, that consumption by those 333 
working in the services sectors may outweigh gains from shifts in production, indicating that 334 
both production and consumption strategies need to go hand in hand.64 Overall, the conclusion 335 
of several recent reports is that no sustainable future that meets both human needs and stays 336 
within planetary boundaries is possible without decreases in consumption among the wealthier 337 
nations.65  338 
3). Shift fiscal policies to reflect environmental values. Currently governments have a great 339 
deal of concern about how they will balance budgets and manage long-term fiscal stressors, 340 
particularly subnational areas with yearly requirements for balanced budgets and the inability 341 
to borrow or go into debt. This is forcing hard choices that have long-term consequences; for 342 
example, New York City, facing a budget deficit of US$7 billion in lost tax revenue since the 343 
pandemic, has proposed a more than 10% cut to the city’s parks department budget, despite 344 
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green space having been an important physical and mental health benefit during lockdown 345 
policies.66 346 
 In light of these challenges, ensuring that state fiscal policies continue to reflect 347 
environmental values and encourage biodiversity is important, and novel financing can help 348 
subnational areas balance their budgets. For example, ecological fiscal transfers (EFT) are a 349 
policy instrument used to redistribute tax revenues among public actors based on ecological or 350 
conservation-related indicators. States have long redistributed public revenues from higher to 351 
lower levels of government to help the latter cover their expenses in providing public goods and 352 
services, but comparatively new is the rationale to use fiscal transfers for biodiversity or 353 
conservation. EFT use ecological indicators (such as the quantity and quality of protected areas 354 
or forest areas) as part of fiscal redistribution formulas, e.g., as a means to compensate 355 
municipalities for their conservation expenses or paying for the spillover benefits of related 356 
areas beyond municipal boundaries.67 To date, there are only a few countries globally that have 357 
implemented EFT (such as Brazil, India, Portugal and France), although there is good potential 358 
to do so with low transaction costs.68, 69 For example, India now distributes 7.5% of its national-359 
level tax revenue based on state forest cover indicators.70 Such approaches can be encouraged 360 
and expanded to assist local governments in supporting conservation while also providing 361 
opportunities for citizens to enjoy more green spaces. 362 
4). Ensure continued international conservation funding. Although governments will be 363 
financially strapped for the foreseeable future, and international aid flows are likely to 364 
decrease, there will still be a need to support international funding for conservation and 365 
sustainable development initiatives, both in the immediate short-term as well as over time. 366 
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Currently, most countries spend only a fraction (less than 1%) of their GDP on "biodiversity-367 
related activities", either for domestic support or foreign environmental aid71, and while private 368 
investment has been substantial in the past72, it is likely to be under strain given current 369 
economic challenges. Even before the pandemic, existing funding was insufficient: for example, 370 
fully implementing activities under the existing Aichi Biodiversity Targets was estimated to 371 
require up to US$ 440 billion in investment to seriously tackle biodiversity loss.73 Increasing 372 
corporate contributions towards conservation, such as from agribusiness and fishing industries 373 
that depend on healthy ecosystems, has been suggested as part of a revamped global 374 
biodiversity accord.74 375 
Now, needs are even greater. Rising unemployment and food insecurity in the global 376 
South as a result of COVID-19 will likely increase pressure on local ecosystems, such as 377 
expansion of agriculture or the wildlife trade, which damages biodiversity and enhances the risk 378 
of future epidemics. Indeed, there is evidence that falling ecotourism dollars and reduced 379 
ranger activity as a result of COVID-19 is leading to more poaching in some areas.75 Some small-380 
scale fisheries, which employ 90% of people in the fishing industry, have virtually collapsed as 381 
China has no longer imported their products since the virus emerged.76 Thus ensuring 382 
employment and livelihood protections for these workers in resource sectors and conservation 383 
areas has been suggested as a priority for global aid packages.75 However, increasing funding 384 
for nature conservation alone will not be sufficient if the indirect drivers of biodiversity loss are 385 
not addressed, and therefore needs to be in concert with the other steps outlined above.  386 
5). Address inequality. Economic inequality is problematic on its own, but it also generates 387 
poorer environmental outcomes; for example, income inequality is associated with excess 388 
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consumption among richer classes77, and more unequal countries also tend to have higher rates 389 
of loss of biodiversity.78  Inequality works in several ways, by both increasing risks and changing 390 
collective incentives to tackle environmental problems. For example, burdens of environmental 391 
risk also tend to fall on those of lower income classes; poorer and minority communities often 392 
face “pollution inequity”, in that they are not just exposed to more pollution but their 393 
ecological footprints are smaller and they cause less pollution.79 Inequality can also decrease 394 
people’s motivation to participate in biodiversity conservation measures if they do not see the 395 
potential benefits of doing so80, and can undermine democratic decision-making to protect 396 
collective public goods.81  397 
Traditional policies to tackle inequality, such as fairer taxation, fees on wealth transfer, 398 
and other measures, can be combined with attention to biodiversity: for example, VAT taxes on 399 
luxury goods with higher negative environmental costs.82 Minimum wage policies also have 400 
potentially positive environmental impacts83, and sustainable life cycle assessments for 401 
products could, for example, include living wages for employees as a criteria.84 Moving towards 402 
a more sustainable economy may create inequalities in and of itself, such as job displacements 403 
in certain sectors (e.g. oil and gas).85 The concept of just transitions captures the idea that any 404 
transformation to a more sustainable economy should not fall on the backs of those already 405 
suffering disproportionate impacts. Combining economic measures to reduce inequality with 406 
stimulus investments in major retooling of energy, land use and other sectors can help facilitate 407 
this more just transition.86  408 
6). Adopt new economic metrics and models. The GA called for “a shift beyond standard 409 
economic indicators such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to include those able to capture 410 
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more holistic, long-term views of economics and quality of life.”1 Changing the metrics used to 411 
assess the economy reflects the increasing evidence of the limitations and biases of dominant 412 
measures such as GDP and HDI (Human Development Indices) and the ways in which they 413 
promote economic growth and associated unsustainable practices.87 Replacing or broadening 414 
them with alternative measures of social welfare would allow inclusion of diverse values and 415 
indicators of well-being.88 Metrics like the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare or the 416 
Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) often subtract “bads” like environmental degradation and 417 
biodiversity loss in monetary terms and add in “goods” not traditionally included in GDP, such 418 
as the value of unpaid work.89 Other approaches such as Material Flow Accounting (MFA) and 419 
Natural Capital Accounting that incorporate environment and ecosystems, and which can 420 
account for the movement of resources across geopolitical borders, have been developed in the 421 
past two decades.90, 91 Increasingly, accounting systems such as the UN System of National 422 
Accounts are adopting these new metrics92, and recently, local, regional and national 423 
governments, including different US states, have shown interest in these measures as well.93 424 
While there is as of yet insufficient empirical evidence of the effectiveness of the new 425 
environmental accounting approaches, they are helpful as a tool to facilitate dialogue on the 426 
diverse values of nature and biodiversity. 427 
 428 
Conclusion: Envisioning a Sustainable Economic Future 429 
Disruptive change has been identified as an important impetus to dramatic sustainability 430 
transformations.94 We currently have a unique opportunity to seize the moment and consider 431 
the economy we want and need for a sustainable, just, and equitable future in a post-pandemic 432 
world.95 Simply tinkering with the status quo was always unlikely to be sufficient to meet the 433 
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large-scale challenge represented by the biodiversity crisis1, therefore taking advantage of the 434 
current COVID-19 crisis to change course and rethink conservation96 as well as how we manage 435 
the global economy seems opportune. As we formulate a recovery agenda, as well as the post-436 
2020 biodiversity framework of the Convention on Biological Diversity, both should have 437 
targets specifically related to altering the economic and financial system to tackle the drivers of 438 
biodiversity and ecosystem loss. Such measures to protect biodiversity as we have outlined 439 
here can be combined with other suggested approaches for a low-carbon recovery, given that 440 
climate change poses a very real threat to species health and ecosystem functioning as well.1 441 
There is evidence for public support in the US for combining biodiversity, climate and economic 442 
policies into one97, and some have suggested the postponed UN climate and biodiversity 443 
meetings be joined together, as both are now rescheduled for later in 2021. 444 
The fact that we are not seeing progress on tying stimulus measures to transformative 445 
economic change is worrisome, and indeed, some post-COVID recovery measures are taking us 446 
in the wrong direction. Reducing taxes, subsidizing fossil fuel production, and relaxing 447 
environmental regulations are all ‘recovery’ steps currently being taken by countries from the 448 
US to Vietnam (Figure 2 and Supplementary Material). Even more ambitious proposed policies, 449 
like the Green New Deal in the US, which focuses on investments in both low-carbon 450 
infrastructure and ecological restoration, tackles economic problems only through a vision of 451 
expanded Keynesian welfare economics.98 Such an approach does not adequately tackle the 452 
larger issue of how to reform other economic drivers of biodiversity loss and climate change we 453 
have outlined here, such as expanded global trade and financialization of production. 454 
Integrating biodiversity across economic and public sectors will require ambition and vision that 455 
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few countries seem willing to undertake, although a handful of roadmaps to ‘build back better’ 456 
have been proposed by influential organizations.99, 100 Overall, envisioning and implementing a 457 
new economic paradigm that tackles these many challenges will be a substantial task, requiring 458 
a transformative approach that entails a reshaping of multiple incentives that steer economies 459 
in ways that preserve, rather than undermine, biodiversity. Taking advantage of this unique 460 
crisis situation before us, we should take bold steps to address the economic drivers of 461 
biodiversity loss and set our world on a path to ecological and social sustainability. 462 
 463 
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Figure One. Economic Drivers of Biodiversity Loss and Ecosystem Change  764 
The Global Assessment identified five main direct drivers of ecosystem change over the past 50 years (blue boxes), 765 
leading to different aspects of nature decline (purple boxes). Economic pressures were identified as a key indirect 766 
driver in the GA, and important elements of changes in economic supply and demand that drive ecosystem loss are 767 
shown here.  768 
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Figure 2. Current post-COVID economic stimulus and recovery packages 770 
As of June 2020, a number of governments have adopted or proposed economic recovery packages, including 771 
stimulus funding, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Only a limited number of countries have included climate 772 
or biodiversity measures in their packages, and a number have introduced measures that would have negative 773 
impacts (such as reducing environmental taxes or regulatory enforcement). Data on current recovery proposals for 774 
selected countries can be found in Supplementary Materials. 775 
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Figure 3. Actions to reform the global economy to reduce impacts on nature  777 
Both short and long-term actions across multiple sectors and actors are needed to address global economic 778 
impacts on biodiversity.  779 
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